James L. Lovett 1. 3. 4. 5. Attornatus Privatus For the Petitioner/Declarant 6. 7. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 8. United States Attorney, Central District of California, Public Corruption Sec. 9. COMMON LAW COURT OF RECORD 10. 11. SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA REPUBLIC 12. James L. Lovett, 622:KW:A455 Ref: *Re:* Account # 11104491-59 13. **Declarant** Before **US Attorney**, **FBI**, 14. DA-Grand Jury, Qualified 15. Magistrate, & Vs. Treasury Inspector General 16. for Tax Administration. TIGTA 17. **Susan Maples**, Taxpayer Rights Advocate FTB **VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR** Civil Rights violations, 18. Jozel Brunett" FTB Chief Counsel Treason of Oath, Fraud, Failure to Perform Duty Owed. 19. and Does 1-20 Malfeasance, & Conspiracy Perpetrator/Employees 20. Against Rights September 23, 2020 21. Date: 22. REDRESS OF GRIEVENCES 23. AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLAINT 24. Declarant, one of the people of California, having observed 25. violations of law by employees under TIGTA and grand jury 26. dominion, brings his redress of grievances in the form of a 27. verified Criminal Complaint at law against defendants 28. individually and severally for willfully and intentionally Page 1 of 36

Verified Criminal Complaint

neglecting their sworn legal duty and knowingly violating declarant's fundamental, common law, and statutory rights by engaging fraud, avoidance, deceit, and oppression, causing injury to declarant. By misprision (18 USC §4), declarant is compelled to report felony violations by bureau employees and supervisors which he observed or has cause to know. Based on personal knowledge and evidence in-hand, declarant issues this Verified Criminal Complaint.

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PARTIES

James L. Lovett, an inhabitant of the municipality of ((hereinafter "declarant"), one of the people of California, without prejudice, complains of the malfeasant behavior of Ms. Susan Maples, Taxpayer Rights Advocate. operating from MS F280, Franchise Tax Board, P.O. Box 1468, Sacramento, California 95812-1468 and the co-conspiratorial actions of her liaison, Jozel Brunett, Office of Chief Counsel, Legal Division MS A 260, Franchise Tax Board, P.O. Box 1720, Rancho Cordova, California. 95741-1720, (hereinafter "perpetrator/employees"). This complaint extends to other known and unknown employees and supervisors associated with the named perpetrators who participated under cloak as so-called "agents" of the Franchise Tax Board (hereinafter "bureau"). This complaint will be presumed to include other employees regardless of their physical location who are supervisors of the employees named above, document preparers, trainers, or coconspirators making or sustaining assessments of suspended or inapplicable penalties as detailed in this complaint and the attached legal memorandum, included by reference as if fully stated herein.

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The Jane and John Does 1-20 referenced as employees in this complaint shall be taken to mean, the actual living employees complicit in the statutory violations, public corruption, and schemes revealed whose identity shall be exposed during the course of this action, regardless of their geographic location, all of whom (hereinafter "employees") are summoned to answer for their collusion in the crimes alleged.

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Declarant asserts perpetrators/employees collectively and individually participated in a deeply-entrenched institutional corruption violating well established constitutional, common, and statutory law including (but not limited to) the following:

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 First Article in Amendment, Bill of Rights, Obstruction of protected right to redress of grievances.

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2. 18 USC §1001, [False] Statements or Entries Generally, 18 USC §1018, Crimen falsi, False writings and fraud, 31 CFR §0.208, Falsification of official records.

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3. 42 USC §1986, Action for neglect to prevent a wrong.²

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4. 18 USC §§241, 242 and 371, Conspiracy against rights.

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¹ <u>Memorandum of Law, Penalty Abuses,</u> Notice of Application of U.S. Bill of Rights and Art. 1, *Declaration of Rights* – California Constitution. - <u>Reservation of Rights and Presentation of Facts and Law</u> (10 pages)

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² **Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 USC §1983**, "Anyone with knowledge of constitutional infractions has a liability, where it is within their power, to correct such wrong. Failure or neglect to correct may result in a year in jail and a \$1,000 fine."

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- Revenue and Restructuring Act, at §1203(a), "Employee 5. Misconduct," obstructing Declarant's due process and redress rights through fraud (silence) and wrongful actions of Revenue Officers under 26 USC §7214(a)(7).
- 18 USC §225, Participation in pattern of unlawful conduct, financial crimes, constructive fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud.
- 7. 18 USC §1503, Obstruction of Justice.

The two named perpetrators have accepted payment to perform critical non-discretionary duties for the people of California, yet in the furtherance of a covert constructive fraud, intentionally avoided doing so. The facts will show that perpetrators willfully engaged the fraud of programmed silence in order to defeat inquiries into procedures and inconvenient facts that would expose the inadequacy of their tenuous penalty assessments arising from the criminal avoidance of their sworn legal duties. Given the statutory duties assigned to their offices, they have a known legal and moral duty to speak,⁴ however, the gambit of silence exposes criminal conduct, and confesses both institutional and personal fraud. "Qui tacet consentit" - Silence is consent.

³ Pub. Law 105-206, Title 1 §1203(a)(6) Employee Misconduct, (7-22-1998) as amended. Defines "Employee Misconduct" and specifies termination for violations. The section describes "Acts or Omissions" with respect to the violation of (a) any right secured under the constitution of the United States [such as due process of law], or (6) violations of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [such as §7851(a)(7)], Department of the Treasury regulations [such as 26 CFR §301.6203-1], or policies of the Internal Revenue Service (including the Internal Revenue Manual) [such as IRM 546 §19(b)(2)] for the purpose of retaliating against or harassing a taxpayer.

⁴ 37 C.J.S., Fraud, §16d and 35a, Fraud and deceit may arise from silence where there is a duty to speak the truth, as well as from the speaking of an untruth.

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INTRODUCTION

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This complaint principally addresses the constructive and conspiratorial violence served upon declarant's protected right to redress of grievances by the deployment of R&TC §19179. Bureau employees have utilized any and all means to obstruct Declarant's rights to a hearing and to his right to be informed as to the nature and cause of the penalty violation(s) that bureau employees have alleged. By the perpetrator's own admissions, they have constructively avoided the true written laws on the books, and have thereby obstructed declarant's right to administrative review of factually and procedurally defective penalty "assessments," which were used solely to repel the citizen's claim regardless of its merit. The perpetrators and employees in this matter willfully conspired to sustain penalties that they either knew or were adequately informed did not apply to the declarant or the "income" type-of-tax by inflicting a pre-programmed tirade of threats, duress, and coercion, (oppression⁵). From the record of this case, it is clear that the principal tactic bureau employees used to defeat the actual law was to immediately characterize all declarant's arguments as "frivolous" and threaten even more cruel penalty retaliations that also do not lawfully apply to the declarant. Then, when caught evading the law and their known duties, they

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⁵ The misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office wrongfully inflicts any injury upon the public including an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, or excessive use of authority by misuse or abuse of authority or power. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.

engage the fraud of silence as a gambit to preserve just a hint of plausible deniability while masking the malfeasance and extortion their ritualized systematic corruption embraces.

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Facts of the case:

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Declarant received a "Frivolous Submission Notice" dated 6/17/2019, which stated that "we" [the bureau] have determined that your protest is a specific frivolous submission because "it is based on an identified frivolous position" that the bureau employees had not identified. The pre-printed notice falsely directed declarant to the FTB website to read the list of "identified frivolous positions." However, the referenced website URL did not and does not contain any such list, and the notice itself was unspecific as to what numbered position, if any, from the federal list was offended. Consequently, there are no facts or sworn claims in evidence by which any genuine violation could be recognized and declarant believes that he is the victim of a nefarious artifice of obfuscation contrived and deployed to punish his innocent questions and compliance attempts for no articulable legal reason.

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⁶ Silence is a species of fraud: "Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading..." U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299-300 (1977) 26.

⁷ In judicio non creditur nisi juratis. In law none is credited unless he is sworn. All the facts must when 27. established, by witnesses, be under oath or affirmation. Cro. Car. 64. Documents required to be produced by the IRS/FTB are unsigned and unsworn as required by 26 USC §6051(a) and do not bear the District Director's Seal as 28. required by 26 CFR 301.7514(c) and (d), 28 USC 1733(b), and Rule 44 and 27 F.R.Civ.P.

1.	From declarant's research and the perpetrator's acquiescence,
3.	below is a summary of three pivotal points of agreement
4.	occasioned by acquiescence and memorialized upon Default:
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6 .	(1) Perpetrators agree that the abused penalty statute imported
7 .	from 26 USC §6702 via §19179 (as amended) shall have legal
8.	force only upon the expressly defined corporate "person" at
9.	26 USC §6671(b), and not individuals or the public generally.
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11.	(2) Perpetrators agree that all penalty statutes must be
12.	promulgated. That is to say, an implementing regulation must
13.	be present on the books at the time of the alleged offense.8
14.	There are zero regulations implementing §6702.
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16.	(3) The perpetrators agree that the misplaced penalty "upheld"
17.	in Chief Counsel, Brunette's "decision" and TRA, Maples'
18.	acquiescence was declared by the U.S. Supreme Court to be
19.	inapplicable to the income type-of-tax. ⁹ (For future
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21.	⁸ "The Act's civil and criminal penalties attach <u>only</u> upon the violation of a regulation promulgated by the Secretary; if the Secretary were to do nothing, the Act itself would impose no penalties on anyone only those who
22.	violate the regulations (not the Code) may incur civil or criminal penalties, it is the actual regulation issued by the Secretary of the Treasury and not the broad authorizing language of the statute, which is to be tested against the
23.	standards of the 4th Amendment." Calif. Bankers Assoc. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 25, 44 (1974) [emphasis added]
24.	⁹ "When Congress added the phrase modifying 'person'—it … was attempting to clarify the type of tax to which the penalty section was applicable. Since under the 1954 amendment the penalty would otherwise be applicable to 'any
25.	tax imposed by this title,' the phrase modifying 'person' was necessary to insure that the penalty provided by that section would be read as applicable only to failure to pay taxes which require collection, that is, third-party taxes,
26.	and not failure to pay 'any tax imposed by this title,' which, of course, would include direct taxes such as employer FICA and income taxes. As both the House and Senate Committees expressed it, 'the application of this penalty is
27.	limited only to the collected or withheld taxes which are imposed on some person other than the person who is required to collect, account for and pay over, the tax.' Thus, by adding the phrase modifying 'person,' Congress
28.	was attempting to clarify the type of tax to which the penalty section was applicable, perhaps inartfully, by reference to the duty of the person required to collect them." Slodov v. United States, 436 US 238, 249-250, (1978), [Underline emphasis added]. See Count-Five of the Complaint.
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reference, declarant refers to these as the <u>Big Three</u>
perpetrator confessions.)

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Declarant believes he has been intentionally misled by Chief Counsel and certain revenue agents who can produce no numbered "frivolous position" relevant to the disputed penalty and, by this subterfuge, the perpetrators and employees have conspired to conceal the *nature and cause* of the alleged violation and coheres acceptance of their treachery by doubling-down on the fraud and oppression. It begs the question- would it be reasonable for the state legislature to require a published list of "frivolous positions," §19179(d)(1), if bureau employees were intended to have no obligation to disclose or reference them at any time in administrative proceedings?

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Maxim of Law: Nihil quod est contra rationem est licitum. Nothing against reason is lawful. Co. Litt. 97.

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Declarant is entitled to be informed of his specific alleged error (if any) so that he may correct it or adequately provide for his defense, and achieve his full *due process* and redress rights. ¹⁰ Certainly, he has the right to be heard in his own defense, ¹¹ a right totally disregarded by the one state officer, the Taxpayer Rights Advocate (TRA), charged with the duty to uphold the people's rights. Thus, Declarant, in obedience to

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¹⁰ <u>United States V. Lovett</u>, (1946).

¹¹ 26 USC §7803(a)(3)(D). Right that the TRA has a sworn duty to protect and advocate.

Misprision, 18 USC §4, is legally compelled to report the TRA's failure to perform a duty owed and the criminal nonfeasance he personally observed to a qualified magistrate, direct supervisor, and/or a specially empaneled grand jury for investigation and indictment, leading to possible apprehension, arrest, and prosecution.

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"Rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution are not to be so lightly treated; they are superior to this supposed necessity [bureau convenience]. The State is forbidden to deny due process of law or the equal protection of the laws for any purpose whatsoever."

<u>Heiner v. Donnan</u> 285 U.S. 312, 325 (1932)

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Given that FTB presumes authority to arbitrarily import and enforce favored federal law, the auxiliary code provisions from the same source must also apply. With respect to RRA-98¹² §1203(a), 26 USC §7214(a)(7), 13 and the perpetrator's public oaths of office, each employee is required to uphold the public's right to specific protections guaranteed under the constitution, the laws passed by congress, and the regulations promulgated in pursuance thereof. 14 Evidence in the record will show that state employees seized upon mere presumption to

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¹² Pub. L 105-206, Title 1 §1203 as amended. Describes penalties against any employee who (1) violates any right under the Constitution or (2) violates any provision of the IRC of 1986, treasury regulations, and policies of the IRS (including the IRM) for the purpose of retaliating against or harassing a taxpayer...

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Penalty statute, Unlawful acts of Revenue Officers or Agents.- (a)(7) "who makes or signs any fraudulent entry in any book, or makes or signs any fraudulent certificate, return, or statement – shall be dismissed from office...."

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¹⁴ IRM 13.1.15.2 (10-31-2004), Elements of Misconduct, (a) An employee violated a law, regulation or rule of conduct. These matters are to be referred to TIGTA.

obstruct the declarant's protected rights and avoid 1. accountability to the written law. By ignoring the actual 3. written law and avoiding the Big Three inconvenient confessions, 4. supra, employees have at best engaged actionable fraud, or at 5. worst egregious constitutional violence (warring with the 6. constitution) which arguably rises to treason of oath. 15 The 7. perpetrators, either knew or should have known by their office 8. and education that they are required to follow the law on the 9. books precisely as written, regardless of the agency preference, 10. secret oaths, supervisor's directions, esprit de corps, hand-11. shakes, working policy, or "interpretation" de jure. 12. 13. "In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes [and penalties] 14. it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by 15.

"In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes [and penalties] it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen." United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, Fed. Cas. No. 16,690; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468, 474; Benziger v. United States, 192 U.S. 38, 55; Gould v. Gould, 245 US 151 (1917) (Emphasis added)

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Evidence will show that the perpetrators and bureau employees did not know the statements affixed to their notices to be true,

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¹⁵ Treason of oath. Warring against the constitution. **Tucker's Blackstone Vol. 1 Appendix Note B [Section 3] 1803-** "If in a limited government the public functionaries exceed the limits which the constitution prescribes to their powers, every such act is an act of usurpation in the government, and, as such, treason against the sovereignty of the people."

and instead of impartially construing the obvious doubt in favor of the petitioner, purposefully utilized false and rebuttable presumptions (the opposite of *due process*) in a vacuum of regulations, to threaten additional \$5,000 penalties for merely seeking clarification and a good faith lawful resolution other than to just "pay-up and shut-up." In attempting to dissuade declarant from exercising his redress rights, and in violation of the criminal code, 18 USC §1001, the state employees placed mere presumptions, fake law, vague generalities, ¹⁶ falsehoods, and threats in their correspondence anyway without confirming the veracity, of any statements contained therein, while the Taxpayer Rights Advocate, Susan Maples, fell totally silent in negligent disregard for her non-discretionary public duty to defend the declarant's rights.

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When Declarant exposed the faulty penalty assessment by decreeing the unchallenged <u>Big Three</u> fact errors and serving the legal memorandum supporting the inapplicability of the instant penalty, to Chief Counsel in a *reconsideration request*, October 1, 2019, perpetrator, **Jozel Brunnett**, went silent. In like manner, when the memorandum and the matter of the inapplicable penalty was referred to the [supposedly independent] Taxpayer Rights Advocate, **Susan Maples**, she joined in the conspiracy of silence. Conspiracy against rights is a crime. Silence is species of fraud. Declarant's fact-finding process, opened for a superior court of record, serves through acquiescence, to

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 $^{^{16}}$ Fraus latet in generalibus. Fraud lies hid in general expressions. [Maxim of Law]

establish the unrebutted truth of the matter and may not subsequently be litigated de-novo. Both perpetrators have acquiesced to the facts as presented in the declarant's paperwork. The memorialized facts are listed in the respective Default notices for each perpetrator and shall serve to defeat (estop) any late contrived facts and arguments before the tribunal. Their refusal to deny or rebut any of the facts given in the individual Notice of Fault, Opportunity to Cure concedes all declarant's facts and confesses administrative errors and criminal negligence listed and confirmed by the subsequent Default notices for each perpetrator, included by reference as if fully restated herein. See Exhibits 1 through 4.

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By the ongoing charade of avoidance, constructive fraud, ¹⁷ conspiracy to obstruct, and collusion of silence, employees have trespassed upon declarant's fundamental and property rights, as is repugnant to the constitution and their oaths of office, RRA-98 §1203(b)(3)(A). Declarant has a right to be heard and to substantive due process, but has been systematically obstructed from exercising these rights in order to shield the bureau's precious pernicious public intimidation with [inapplicable] penalties upon the public. Paradoxically, if employees were forced to admit that the law means what it plainly says and confine their authority within that conferred by the actual published law, they would not be able to do what they do.

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¹⁷ A false representation of a matter of fact—whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of what should have been disclosed—that deceives and is intended to deceive another so that the individual will act upon it to his or her legal injury.

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¹⁸ Moving a false claim into the public constitutes the criminal act of BARATRY.

¹⁹ Sixth Article in Amendment. 26 USC §7803(a)(3)(A).

Page 13 of 36

Declarant exercises his right to redress and accuses bureau

exculpatory evidence as a basis to extort funds and sustain

authority than the postman to impose a self-executing civil

penalty upon the [individual] people of California in the

absence of an active statute from an enacted IR Title that

subjects the "individual" and an implementing regulation.

COUNT ONE OF THE COMPLAINT

Employees violate Declarant's fundamental rights

Declarant alleges violation of his fundamental due process right

to be informed of the *nature* and cause¹⁹ of the penalty charges

for which he is presumed liable. The First Amendment right to

convenience of the bureau employees who institutionally desire

when the bureau is attempting to obscure the inescapable fact

that the declarant is not the "person" liable for the penalty,

to deter embarrassing legal briefs and live hearings, especially

freedom of speech and redress of grievances supersedes the

Declarant believes that the FTB employees legally have no more

defective penalty levies under color of law, 18 USC §241.

in the absence of conclusive facts and in the face of

employees and the perpetrators named with the criminal act of

collectively deploying harassing, false, and fraudulent notices¹⁸

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Declarant avers that his *due process* rights were systematically obstructed with constructive avoidance by the Chief Counsel who has dishonored her fiduciary duty to disclose for the record, the specific numbered "frivolous position" that the declarant was alleged to have offended from the official list as specified by R&TC §19179(d)(1). To be perfectly clear, declarant has no information in his possession that identifies a violation of any numbered item on the [unpublished] state or official federal "frivolous position" list. By failure to specifically identify a previously-determined [purported] violation, bureau employees, the Taxpayer Rights Advocate, and Chief Counsel have allowed or bid concurrent unlawful collateral attacks from line agents of the bureau to force declarant to surrender his treasure, rights, and withdraw his cause. In subversion of declarant's right to be heard in his own defense, the employees and perpetrators personally used threats, programmed silence, and intimidation to obstruct due process even at the opening-bell (before any testimony could be heard) in the face of the law's stringent requirements upholding the constitutional protections and statutory rights declarant has relied on. Perpetrators gave no valid reasoning or explanation for refusing declarant's claims.

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26 USC 6402(k) (P. L. 105 - 206 §3505): Explanation of reason for refund disallowance: "In the case of a disallowance of a claim for refund, the Secretary shall provide the taxpayer with an explanation

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Claimant was forced to hire a certified research paralegal (with specific expertise in tax law), but he could locate no authority to substitute an arbitrary assessment of a penalty in lieu of the required §6402(k) explanation.

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Assurances of *due process* are preserved in the first sentence of 26 USC §7804(b), the necessity of *due process* is implicit in 28 USC §2463, and First and Fifth Amendment protections are specifically acknowledged in provisions cited in 26 CFR §601, et seq. with no exception for "tax matters."

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"There is something specially repugnant to justice in using rules of practice in such a manner as to (prevent a defendant) from defending himself, especially when the professed object of the rules so used is to provide for his defense." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 822-823 (1975).

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Evidence will show that the perpetrators and state employees violated the Faretta doctrine and piloted their penalty scheme in an arbitrary and seditious manner, corruptly contrived to deny substantive and procedural rights to their target by withholding information as to the nature and cause of their claim (if any), by not specifically disclosing what they purportedly found to be "frivolous" from the Treasury Secretary's list and by obstructing through threats, obfuscation

and harassment the right to *due process, redress of grievances.*and to be heard in declarant's own defense.

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Declarant was, through harassment and fear of cruel (high dollar) punishment, deprived of his redress rights to be heard and to submit evidence that would draw into question the legal sufficiency of the penalty "assessment." Declarant, a man (not a corporate "personna"), suffers as a consequence of this absurdity, effectively denying his right to redress. No state employee cited any numbered frivolous position or promulgated regulation as the basis for levying imported bureau penalties.

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Rule I. An exaction by the U.S. Government, which is not based upon law, statutory or otherwise [published regulations), is a taking of property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 26 CFR §601.106(f)(1)

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Declarant has a right to know the *nature* and the cause of the accusation(s), 20 and in penalty matters, to be confronted [at hearing or trial] with the witness(es) against him. The true admissible facts will show that there were no adverse witnesses with knowledge reflected in the record, but early-on employees proceeded to compose false statements in their notices such as: "you continue to raise issues that are frivolous or reflect a desire to delay or impede tax administration." The vague

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Amendment 6. Also the people certainly have a right to know whether the penalty rests upon a direct or indirect tax. See also the FTB Mission Statement.

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construction of his discourse makes it impossible for declarant to discern which, if any, of the several listed elements on the Secretary's official frivolous position list (as distinguished from the IRS fake website list) had triggered the inquiry. Obviously none of the general allegations or listed elements applied to the instant penalty assessment matter, leaving the declarant to guess as to what official "argument number" or secret law the perpetrators had in mind.

"It is the basic principal of due process that an enactment is void

for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague

laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that

a man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we

insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a

accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair

reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so he may act

warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to

be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who

apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy

matters to policemen, judges, and juries [and revenue agents] for

resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant

dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." Grayned v.

Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).

"The [law] is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it 'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, 'U.S. v. Harriss,

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arrests and convictions [penalties]." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88; Herdon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242.

347 U.S. 612, 617, and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic

Evidence will show that by going silent, the perpetrators were fundamentally erecting a *protection racket* to excuse laziness and to shield understaff and supervisory agents at the expense of their fiduciary duty to serve and protect the public. The rush to *summary administrative execution* of new penalties or the deferral in answering an official claim of abatement is a clear violation of state and federal law prohibiting such arbitrary processing of disputed tax and penalties.

"Where administrative action may result in loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living, any doubt as to the extent of power delegated to administrative officials is to be resolved in citizen's favor, and court must be especially sensitive to the citizen's rights where proceeding is non-judicial." United <u>States v. Minker</u>, 350 U.S. 179, 188 (1956)

Ultimately, for the perpetrators, it is a dereliction of a clear fiduciary duty. The perpetrators made a cowardly choice to simply avoid performing the job they are being paid to do. Chief Counsel must be held to account for formulating, upholding, and concealing a clandestine [and unconstitutional] one-step unilateral administrative execution that perpetrators have conspired to erect to the end of depriving the declarant of

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his property and *substantive due process* as contemplated by the "arising under" clause at Article III § 2.1 and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution.

It has been long established that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution.

Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 271

U.S. 583, 599. "Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end," United States v. Reading Co., 226

U.S. 324, 357, "and a constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional result." Western Union

Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1.

"All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation [and penalty]. This proposition may almost be pronounced self-evident. The sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists by its authority, or is introduced by its permission." Chief Justice John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 418, 429

Declarant's fundamental rights do <u>not</u> exist factually by the authority of government, nor were they introduced or sustained by its permission. Declarant does not possess a corporate persona by which he takes on the attributes of a fictitious "person" under a duty, §6671(b). Declarant believes that there are no verified claims and no witnesses with knowledge to

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COUNT TWO OF THE COMPLAINT

Perpetrators fail to correct a known wrong A Civil Rights violation, 42 USC §1983

Declarant has expressly engaged the court of record three-step fact-finding process, verifying through bureau acquiescence, that the respondents are in full agreement with all facts listed in the respective Notices of Fault and Default. 21 Chief among the facts is a confession of violating declarant's constitutional rights, see Count One of the Complaint. Accordingly, perpetrators have confessed their knowledge of multiple wrongs committed by themselves and bureau employees upon declarant. The secondary purpose of the Fault and Default notices was to encourage the perpetrators to correct the wrongs that they admitted by programmed silence. There is a penalty for avoiding the correction of a known wrong:

Anyone with knowledge of constitutional infractions has a liability, where it is within their power, to correct such wrong. Failure or neglect to correct may result in a year in jail and a \$1,000 fine. 42 USC §1986

Declarant repeatedly reminded perpetrators of their liability under the Civil Rights laws, but they chose to continue avoidance of their duty through silence thus serving admissible evidence of their willful and personal evasion of the law.

²¹ Ten fact confessions listed for Susan Maples, See Exhibits 1 through 4

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One would reasonably expect that a public servant with the title of *Taxpayer Rights Advocate* would perform as her Position Duty Statement requires, and in consideration of her paycheck actually perform her non-discretionary duty. The TRA is ultimately accountable to the public, and is liable for the

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failure to do the job she is paid to perform. At the very least, the TRA is dispossessed of any discretion to hide behind her "lofty" office at defiance of her known legal duty to the people. Having verified first-hand evidence of her arrogant refusal to advocate for the rights of the declarant, it becomes declarant's duty to report the egregious failure to correct the wrongs that she actually acknowledged in the fact-finding process. Declarant authorized Ms. Maples to correct the exposed wrongs but she did absolutely nothing, zero, nil, zilch, zippo, squat. She has earned her place in the complaint now before the magistrate and must be held accountable for completely ignoring her known legal duty to the public.

COUNT THREE OF THE COMPLAINT

Perpetrators Proceed in want of a Regulation

<u>26 CFR §601.702</u>

Declarant alleges that perpetrator/employees reasonably knew, ought to have known by virtue of their employment and training, or were adequately informed by declarant's petition and notices that assessable penalties require regulations, 26 CFR §601.702, and publication in the Federal Register in order to exert the force of law. California (FTB) cannot import federal law and exercise it in a manner forbidden the Internal Revenue Service.

"The Service is bound by the regulations." [IRM, 4.10.7.2.3.4

| 1. | (05/14/99)] | | | | | |
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| 3. | "For Federal tax purposes, the Federal Regulations govern." Lyeth | | | | | |
| 4. | v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 1938, which goes on to state that the | | | | | |
| 5. | implementing regulations have to be consistent with the statute. | | | | | |
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| 7. | The Federal Register Act, found at 44 USC §1505(a)(1) requires | | | | | |
| 8. | that any given statute that prescribes a departmental function, | | | | | |
| 9. | creates an obligation, or <u>prescribes a penalty</u> , must be | | | | | |
| 10. | implemented by regulations published in the Federal Register. | | | | | |
| 11. | | | | | | |
| 12. | Sec. 1505. Documents to be published in Federal Register | | | | | |
| 13. | (a) Proclamations and Executive Orders; <u>Documents Having General</u> | | | | | |
| 14. | Applicability and Legal Effect; Documents Required To Be Published | | | | | |
| 15. | by Congress. There shall be published in the Federal Register | | | | | |
| 16. | | | | | | |
| 17. | (1) Presidential proclamations and Executive orders, except those | | | | | |
| 18. | not having general applicability and legal effect or effective only | | | | | |
| 19. | against Federal agencies or persons in their capacity as officers, | | | | | |
| 20. | agents, or employees thereof; | | | | | |
| 21. | | | | | | |
| 22. | (2) documents or classes of documents that the President may | | | | | |
| 23. | determine from time to time have general applicability and legal | | | | | |
| 24. | effect; and | | | | | |
| 25. | | | | | | |
| 26. | (3) documents or classes of documents that may be required so to be | | | | | |
| 27. | published by Act of Congress. <u>For the purposes of this chapter</u> | | | | | |
| 28. | every document or order which prescribes a penalty has general | | | | | |

<u>applicability and legal effect</u>. (emphasis added)

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Declarant and his hired research paralegal could find zero regulations or Federal Register citations implementing §6702. Imported state-utilized statutes from the IRC ought to be able to produce the volume, page number, and date of publication of the regulation(s) they were using to levy a penalty against declarant, but they failed to comply in any way.

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"A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, ... and if he deliberately conceals material information from them, he is guilty of fraud." McNally v United States 483 U.S. 350 (1987) "Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading... We cannot condone this shocking conduct...If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately" U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299-300 (1977)

This was not an academic request, because declarant's research paralegal could find no published state regulation or Federal Register authority, so the burden to prove the existence of the regulation rests upon the bureau. ²² Is it not then reasonable to conclude that §6702, and other statutes without published Subtitle F "regulations," cannot claim general applicability and

²² R&TC §19180; 26 USC §6703(a); 5 USC §556(d): "Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of the rule or order has the burden of proof...See also: McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 289 U.S. 178.

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legal effect either in Washington, D.C. or in Sacramento?

Clearly §6702 and the other referenced penalty sections, having zero regulations applicable upon the general public, are inarguably void upon declarant and others similarly situated, and grant no authority for perpetrators to contrive and enforce an arbitrary penalty policy as if it were an actual regulation.

"The Act's civil and criminal penalties attach <u>only</u> upon the violation of a regulation promulgated by the Secretary; <u>if the Secretary were to do nothing, the Act itself would impose no penalties on anyone</u> ... only those who violate the regulations (not the Code) may incur civil or criminal penalties, it is the actual regulation issued by the Secretary of the Treasury and not the broad authorizing language of the statute, which is to be tested against the standards of the 4th Amendment." <u>Calif. Bankers Assoc. v.</u>

<u>Shultz</u>, 416 U.S. 25, 44, 1974 [underline emphasis added]

This is precisely the argument declarant (petitioner) made in his attached legal memorandum, "Recitation of Active Law Controlling Penalty Assessment in the United States and in California." This (exhibit) memorandum, included by reference as if fully stated herein, was ignored by the named perpetrators as if they had no obligation to observe rights that have been raised or follow the published laws when it better suits them to ignore both. Considering the exhaustive research, where no Federal Register (FR) cross-references or Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR) implementing §6702 could be found, it becomes 1. abundantly clear that the Secretary, in fact, did nothing. 3. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that state employees 4. intentionally and recklessly concealed the fact that no 5. regulations exist and contrived a faux mystical authority 6. clearly inapplicable to declarant by regulation, thus denying 7. separation of powers, and due process, engaging fraud, and 8. violating Declarant's protected rights. 9.

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Ex Dolo malo non oritur Actio. A right of action cannot arise out of fraud. Maxim of law (inarguable truth).

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That perpetrator/employees may have been unaware or arguably mis-educated, is no defense, ²³ although it may in turn implicate their supervisors and trainers. Declarant believes part of the inability to achieve a lawful resolution quickly is that FTB employees presume facts not in evidence, utilize inapplicable bureau policy in lieu of the actual published law, threaten and harass the general public, and conspire to bring all private citizens into their contrived exclusive corporate jurisdiction.

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²³ See RRA-98, §1203(a) and 26 USC §7214(a)(1 & 7), Offenses by officers and employees of the United States. Government officials are presumed to know the law.

COUNT FOUR OF THE COMPLAINT

Utilizing a Penalty for a "Person" Not Liable

26 USC §6671(b)

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Chief among their duties, bureau employees must submit proof to the record that declarant is the "person," as exclusively defined for subchapter B, who is under a [corporate] duty, who may be penalized according to 26 USC §6671(b). The term "person" is a predicate element, and must be proven before the rest of the statute (§6702) has any relevance. Declarant has no information that he is a corporate "person" or even possesses a legally-binding corporate persona.

26 USC §6671. (b) Person defined: "The term 'person,' as used in this subchapter (subchapter B), includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs."

In consideration of the duress and fear of penalties the bureau brandishes to prevent the presentation of any argument the perpetrators dislike, do not understand, or might find embarrassing while being deposed, nevertheless, declarant is under a duty to report fraud, corruption, and malfeasance that he personally observed. 18 USC §4.

Perpetrators sought relief from their known legal duty to prove jurisdiction and that declarant is the lawful subject of the penalty. Lower level employees utilized colorful notices containing false and misleading legal citations, and high-dollar

threats²⁴ in order to obstruct the presentation of any facts the bureau disfavored, for convenience and to avoid scrutiny.

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Rancho Cordova employees, presenting themselves as "impartial," are in fact essentially shaping the record for possible judicial appeal and obstructing justice by barring the door with threats and intimidation (witness tampering, 18 USC §1512(b)(1)), to prevent the exposure of bureau error and any written law potentially fatal to their mission to efficiently destroy their challengers and "get the money." Accordingly, declarant alleges conspiracy to commit extortion on the part of each perpetrator named in this complaint for their complicity with other employees and supervisors (even if though silence) to engage fraud and oppression under *color of law*, 18 USC §241, Conspiracy against Rights.

COUNT FIVE OF THE COMPLAINT

Perpetrators Fraudulently Apply Penalty to Income Tax

Slodov v. United States, 436 US 238

The

Perhaps the most egregious assault upon the sovereign is to

Supreme Court held that the "person liable" for the penalty, as

employer FICA or the Income Type-of-Tax. Therefore, the ruling

defined at §6671(b), was not the taxpayer connected with the

assess a penalty upon an individual exempted by law.

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²⁴ 5. 18 USC §§876 and 1341, Mailing threatening communications.

Page 29 of 36

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| "When Congress added the phrase modifying 'person'-it was not seeking | | | | | | |
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| further to describe the class of persons defined in §6671(b) upon whom | | | | | | |
| fell the responsibility for collecting taxes, but was attempting to | | | | | | |
| clarify the type of tax to which the penalty section was applicable. | | | | | | |
| Since under the 1954 amendment the penalty would otherwise be | | | | | | |
| applicable to 'any tax imposed by this title,' the phrase modifying | | | | | | |
| 'person' was necessary to insure that the penalty provided by that | | | | | | |
| section would be read as applicable only to failure to pay taxes which | | | | | | |
| require collection, that is, third-party taxes, and not failure to pay | | | | | | |
| 'any tax imposed by this title,' which, of course, would include direct | | | | | | |
| taxes such as employer FICA and income taxes. As both the House and | | | | | | |
| Senate Committees expressed it, 'the application of this penalty is | | | | | | |
| limited only to the collected or withheld taxes which are imposed on | | | | | | |
| some person other than the person who is required to collect, account | | | | | | |
| for and pay over, the tax.' Thus, by adding the phrase modifying | | | | | | |
| 'person,' Congress was attempting to clarify the type of tax to which | | | | | | |
| the penalty section was applicable, perhaps inartfully, by reference to | | | | | | |
| the duty of the person required to collect them." Slodov v. United | | | | | | |
| <u>States</u> , 436 US 238, 249-250, (1978). | | | | | | |

The perpetrators apparently believe that the memorialized rights of the people can be superseded at the convenience of the servant government. Of course, it makes no sense to assign greater weight to an arguably inapplicable penalty provision of a code (in a total vacuum of regulations) than to an unambiguous right (redress of grievances) secured by the constitution.

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If an unelected bureaucrat can extort \$5,000 from a citizen who is merely exercising his protected rights with no active statute or implementing regulation in evidence, especially when the Supreme Court gave clear guidance that the penalty was not applicable to the Income Tax, then has not a criminal conspiracy evolved through constructive fraud to operate in lieu of the actual written law? In this case is not the citizen being restrained at the whim of a tyrant? Would the citizen then be free, yes or no? Of course not, the citizen would become a slave at the hand of his [public] servant. Freedom and due process²⁵ thereafter would have little meaning?

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Bureau employees utilizing false statements, deceptive discourse, fake laws, and threatening language in an attempt to influence the testimony of a fact witnesses and deny *due process* must be held accountable to an unbiased magistrate and tribunal. This is the fiduciary obligation of the perpetrators, but like

^{27. | 25 &}quot;[T]he governing due process principle obliges the I.R.S. [and FTB] to provide a prompt hearing at which the I.R.S. must prove "at least probable cause" for its claim. Due process would at least require some supporting rationale for denying taxpayer the opportunity for a prompt preliminary determination by an unbiased tribunal on the validity of the basis for the assessment." Laing v. U.S., 423 U.S. 161 (1976)

| 1. | truth, "duty" is not a value for Chief Counsel and Taxpayer | | | | | |
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| 3. | Rights Advocate, either. | | | | | |
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| 6. | SUMMARY AND CALL TO ACTION: | | | | | |
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| 8. | This criminal complaint shall be served upon qualified state | | | | | |
| 9. | magistrates per 18 USC §4, and is hereby submitted to The | | | | | |
| 10. | Franchise Tax Board and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax | | | | | |
| 11. | Administration (TIGTA) who is charged with the following public | | | | | |
| 12. | duty: | | | | | |
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| 14. | "Detect and deter fraud and abuse in IRS programs and | | | | | |
| 15. | operations. Prevent fraud, abuse, and deficiencies in IRS | | | | | |
| 16. | programs and operations." | | | | | |
| 17. | | | | | | |
| 18. | Declarant complains of employees within the subject bureau and | | | | | |
| 19. | especially FTB employees in Rancho Cordova and Sacramento who | | | | | |
| 20. | engage fraud with deliberate purpose and calculation to deny <i>due</i> | | | | | |
| 21. | process through computer fraud, obstruction of rights, mail | | | | | |
| 22. | fraud, conspiracy, and failure to discharge clearly known legal | | | | | |
| 23. | duties; in other words, business as usual. | | | | | |
| 24. | | | | | | |
| 25. | "RRA 98 mandates changes to the way IRS [and FTB through imported | | | | | |
| 26. | code sections] does business, and will result in enhanced taxpayer | | | | | |
| 27. | protection and rights." TIGTA Website. | | | | | |
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Declarant reserves the right to augment and amend this complaint as necessary to include any further criminal violations or subsequent retaliatory conduct observed by bureau employees as he attempts to redress this matter and to obtain abatement of the unlawful penalties improperly "assessed."

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Declarant calls upon the US Attorney, Public Corruption Unit and the Treasury Inspector General to investigate the arrogance and overreach of the perpetrator/employees engaged in unilateral administrative execution²⁶ (violation of separation of powers) and Chief Counsel lawyers preying upon people not subject to the penalty as outlined, supra. Declarant asks that the named employee(s) and supervisor(s) discovered to be complicit in denying declarant's due process rights and issuing unlawful assessments be called to account for their malfeasance and if any of the counts are found true, impose the appropriate sanction(s) up to and including sanctions, incarceration, and dismissal from employment. Any one count found not to be a true bill shall not prejudice the remaining counts. There ought to be and legally is no excuse to retain any employee of the bureau (including their supervisors and their supervisor's supervisor) complicit in or routinely violating any express written law of California and congress, as in this case. Declarant is not arguing with the tax or the law. Declarant

27. 28. would have no dispute with any employee of the bureau who

Unilateral Administrative Execution declared unconstitutional, <u>Duncan v. Kahanamoku Sheriff</u>, 327 U.S. 304 (1946)

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Culpa lata dolo aequiparatur. Gross negligence is held equivalent to intentional wrong. [Maxim of Law]

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By the ongoing charade, that Chief Counsel had an opportunity and a duty to cure, consisting of non-response, fraud, threating communications, conspiracy to obstruct, trespass on the case, and a collusion of silence, employees have deprived declarant his God-given and fundamental rights to property and his pursuit of happiness, as is repugnant to the constitution and the employee's oaths of office. Declarant has a right to be heard and to substantive due process, but has been ritualistically denied this right in order to sanitize the record of any testimony by anyone who has actually read the published law and

| faithfully applied the rules of statutory construction. |
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| Paradoxically, if employees were forced to admit that the law |
| means what it says, they would not be able to do what they do. |
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| Wherefore, it is declarant's wish that the perpetrator employees |
| named and their direct supervisors associated with the faulty |
| penalty assessments, be detained and held to account for their |
| corruption and malfeasance by which they dishonored their oaths, |
| and engaged in criminal usurpation outside their limited subject |
| matter and territorial jurisdictions specified in law |
| culminating in statutory violations and criminal trespass on the |
| case and upon the property and rights of the declarant and his |
| family. With no adhesion contract in evidence stating |
| otherwise, declarant has a right to have his redress and case- |
| in-chief heard by an impartial administrative examiner (or |
| tribunal - court of record) who shall apply the law precisely as |
| written, and not otherwise. To the ends of justice, it is the |
| sovereign's wish that perpetrator/employees conspiring to |
| obstruct and interfere with the people's rights as described, |
| supra, shall be apprehended and held to account. |
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| For the Tribunal: |
| |
| James L. Lovett |
| People of California |
| Attornatus Privatus |
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| <i>3.</i> | <u>Verification</u> | | | | | | | |
| 4. | I declare under penalty of perjury, 28 U.S.C. §1746(1), pursuant to of the laws of the United States of America that I have read the foregoing crimin complaint, know its contents, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, statements therein are true, correct, complete, and made in good faith. | | | | | | | |
| 5. | | | | | | | | |
| 6. | Having first-hand knowledge of the facts of this matter, the forgoing would be my testimony if called upon to witness. | | | | | | | |
| 7. | Submitted September 23, 2020 | | | | | | | |
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| 10. | James L. Lovett | | | | | | | |
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| 14. | Notary acknowledgement: | | | | | | | |
| 15.
16. | In the Republic of California, USA County of Sacramento On the day of, 2020, before me personally came James L. Lovett, a man, known by me (or proved to me, on the basis of | | | | | | | |
| 17. | | | | | | | | |
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19. | satisfactory evidence) to be the individual described in and who executed in my presence the foregoing instrument. | | | | | | | |
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| 21. | Notary Public My Commission expires: | | | | | | | |
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| | Verified Criminal Complaint | | | | | | | |